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 THE RATIONAL(E)  OF AN EMOTIONAL 
SOCIETY:  A CARTESIAN REFLECTION 
Marc  De Kesel  
 
 
Surely if entrails have any prophetic force, neces-
sarily that force either is in accord with the laws of 
nature, or is fashioned in some way by the will and 
power of the gods.  
Cicero, De divinatione II, xii, 29 
 
What is in a word?  
‗Emotions in a rational society‘. It could have been the title of a publication 
ten or twenty years ago. In that time, civilization was considered to be ‗over-
rationalized‘ and our lives objectified down to the most precise detail. The 
general complaint, then, concerned the lack of room for feelings, emotions, 
and other kinds of human subjectivity. Things have changed radically since 
then; indeed, today we are told to live in an ‗emotional society‘. The central 
problem, today, concerns how difficult it is to find objective coordinates. Vis-
ual culture unremittingly seduces us with a profusion of images, corporate culture 
opts for highly estimated emotional intelligence, and art requires an empathic  
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approach. Down with rationality‘s hegemony; down with the dictatorship of hard facts.  
 Has the tide radically turned? Has the authority of rationality and facts been replaced 
by one of feelings? Have we finally learned to live at the level of our emotional intelli-
gence? One does not have to look far to see that the ostensive shift from rational culture to 
today‘s emotional society did not provoke an earthquake. Is the shift truly greater than one 
more superficial effect? And if this is indeed the case, what is the promotion of an emo-
tional society really about?  My thesis is that, behind this semblance of transformation, 
things remain essentially unchanged; moreover, the terms ‗rational‘ or ‗emotional society‘ 
are principally used in order to keep something unsaid, hidden, repressed. In what follows, 
I try to uncover the repressed, as well as the motives underlying this repression. 
What, for instance, does a term like ‗emotional society‘ tell us? And what does it keep 
untold? What does it say by not saying it? The term does not tell us that society is emo-
tional. It tells us that society says to be emotional. ‗Emotional society‘ is thus a reflexive 
term: it refers to the discourse people reproduce when talking about themselves and about 
what they consider to be their culture, society, and world. The ‗emotionality‘ the term de-
notes concerns discourse: it is, thus, there, and not in society itself, that feelings and emo-
tion are highly rated. The terminology of this emotional discourse stems from various 
sources, in which psychology takes a prominent place. As the discourse says, emotions 
have their rights, and society must respect these rights. Emotions, therefore, must be given 
an objective status. Henceforth, whilst they are difficult to fathom and often appear irra-
tional, they are a fact, and as such, they must be accorded an objective place within to-
day‘s society.  
By characterising our society as emotional, we not only express our right to have feel-
ings and to allow them in the public sphere, we, in fact, take for granted that feelings have 
already conquered that right— that this right already belongs to the objective reality—, 
and, as such, must be taken into account, even when they are not still fully able to defend 
themselves in the court of rationality. The emotional has a place of equal value, and the 
time has now come for the rational to be taken to emotionality‘s court.  
So, the popular reference to ‗emotional society‘ hides a subtle shift: ‗emotions must be 
given room‘ has silently transformed into ‗emotions are a fact‘. And, once again, this is 
not a shift in the facts themselves, but; rather, in the discourse. It is a matter of saying or, 
more precisely, letting things be understood without saying it in so many words. It is in-
cluded in the term‘s simple suggestion. Mainstream psychology is one of the disciplines to 
back this up: emotions, for which the rights are claimed, are presented as if  no longer re-
quiring such a claim. Or, phrased otherwise, they are ‗facts‘ in the very claim they should 
be respected as facts.  
 The term ‗emotional society‘ is thus underpinned by reason and a rationale— in addi-
tion to a ratio  and, more specifically, a modern ratio—, for the latter has its rationale to 
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promote certain terms; for instance, the rationale to keep modernity‘s fragile condition in 
balance. ‗Emotional society‘ is one of the tools that serve this purpose.  
But, first, what is modernity? What characterizes modern rationality in such a way that 
emotions and passions can function as its symptoms?   
Modernity …  
Modernity names the paradigmatic discourse expressing the way West-Europeans have 
related to reality in the preceding four centuries. Although pioneered in the 17th century, 
this discourse has developed in such a way that it still supplies the ‗grammar‘ of today‘s 
common sense.  
By ‗paradigmatic discourse‘, I mean ‗the set of misunderstandings through which we 
understand one another‘. It is the lexicon of ‗big words‘ immediately understood by eve-
ryone on the simple basis that everyone supposes them understood by all others— whilst, 
in fact, no one has any full comprehension. Who we really are, what it all matters, why 
things are what they are: on such questions— as banal as they are abysmal— nobody real-
ly has the answer. However, everyone acts as if all the others have some answer; and even 
if each one of us personally has doubts about these supposed answers, they operate none-
theless as a common point of reference. They provide the coordinates of a discourse in 
which everyone can make themselves understandable. It is, thus, a misunderstanding on 
the basis of which we can understand one another. A misunderstanding crystallized in a 
little textile of big words: this is the ground on which a collective identity, a culture, a 
‗time‘, is based.  
The big words that characterised the Middle Ages were ‗creature‘, ‗grace‘, ‗natura‘, 
‗supranature‘, and the biggest and most central of all: ‗God‘. Nobody knew precisely 
whom or what God was— the cleverest philosophers of the period were acutely aware of 
that—, but, at the same time, nobody doubted that the very foundations of our reality were 
buttressed by the very term itself. At that period, the basic sensitivity was one of servitude 
and dependence; you understood yourself as wholly dependent upon what the surrounding 
creature— subordinates, your equals, your lord, and, finally, God— was giving you. Dur-
ing the wars of religion in the 16th century, this scenario of big words became the site of 
social, political, and cultural struggle. Within only a few generations, that scenario lost a 
significant amount of public support, which, in turn, led to the emergence of a  new con-
sensus, one based around the axiom that people should no longer militarily fight one 
another in the name of a God, or for any other religious reason. Henceforth, people should 
be free to believe in whichever God or Non-God they prefer; social and cultural order, 
then, would no longer be subverted by religion or faith— or so it was commonly assumed.  
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 The 17th century witnessed the inception of the idea that man does not live off of his 
dependence on the surrounding creature— a dependence which, ultimately, refers to the 
godly Creator. From now on, man understands himself as independent and free. Not in the 
sense that he claims to be himself the creator of all that is; but in the sense that it is from 
that perspective that he now relates to reality, including God. He is himself the starting 
point of that relation, and for that he needs but himself. He is free to doubt whatever he 
can. It is precisely in that doubt, that man discovers his true ‗self‘, i.e. that which, in the 
very moment of radical doubt, reveals itself as mere certainty: his thinking and doubting 
‗self‘. This is the ‗method‘ through which René Descartes proceeded to conceive of the 
‗free self‘ as the new ‗ground‘ of certainty founding our relation to reality; it became the 
new ‗episteme‘, a new ‗misunderstanding through which people understood— and still 
understand— one another‘. 1  
This episteme was a rational one. Rationality made modern man sure, not only about 
the foundation of his knowledge lying within his own thinking— his subject—, but also 
about what that knowledge says about the outside reality— its object. It allowed him to 
prove that his free perspective was sufficiently consistent so as to have a reliable grip on 
reality. This made the difference with respect to passions and emotions. ‗Passion‘ derived 
from the Greek word ‗‘ — ‗pathein‘: meaning to be moved, touched, affected; 
which is also the meaning of the Latin word from which ‗emotion‘ derives. Collectively 
these terms thus refer to a semantic field of words meaning ‗being touched or affected 
from outside‘— a meaning contrary to the free independence of the modern inner ‗self‘.   
The modern, Cartesian subject cannot understand itself as dependent on such affection. 
It owes to itself a methodical doubt about it, and, on that basis, must submit all affection 
to its regime of self-assured certainty. Within Cartesian logic, there is no space for an 
original affection, i.e. for an affection that moves the free subject on the very level of its 
foundation.  
Nonetheless, Descartes‘s oeuvre simultaneously testifies to an interminable struggle 
with the issues of passions and emotions; it is no mere accident that the last of his writings 
is precisely about the affections and passions of the ‗soul‘: Les passions de l‘âme (1649).2 
                                               
 
 
1
 The term ‗episteme‘ is used in a Foucauldian sense; see for instance Michel Foucault (1966), Les mots et les 
choses, Paris: Gallimard, p. 13.  
2
 René Descartes (1988), Les passions de l‘âme, précédé de La pathétique cartésienne par Jean-Maurice Mon-
noyer, Paris : Gallimard; (1990), Passions of the soul, translated by Stephen Voss, Indianapolis: Hackett Publis-
hing Company.  Descartes developed the ideas for his theory of the passions in an intense exchange of letters 
with the Elisabeth van de Palts, a German princes living in the same Dutch region as he did. For the edition of 
the original text, see: René Descartes & Elisabeth van de Palts (2000), Briefwisseling, ingeleid door René Gude 
en vertaald door Jeanne Holierhoek, Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek. 
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From a Cartesian perspective, the title is rather provocative, and even contradictory. For 
Descartes defines the ‗soul‘ (l‘âme) as the agency which does not obey any affection or 
passion: it is a doubting, thinking agency, and, therefore, an autonomous, and free one. 
Resultantly, anything that tries to touch or affect it is always already touched by the 
doubting act of that soul, by its thinking. The affection is, thus, either rejected or incorpo-
rated within the realm of the soul‘s ‗clear and distinguished ideas‘, illustrating its untou-
chability and freedom. Even in the case of rejection, there has never been any real affec-
tion or touch.  
However, Descartes‘s oeuvre nevertheless ends up telling us that the soul is affected 
and moved, and that the soul, for its part, moves and causes affects. The idea that the body 
is moved by the soul is a real problem for the Cartesian system. For if body and soul are 
truly two different kinds of reality— two radically separate substances, as Descartes 
‗proved‘—, how can they relate to one another on a fundamental level? How, for exam-
ple, can the cause of action in one substance lay in the other one? In contradistinction to 
Aristotle, who defines the soul as the animating force of the body, and the body as that 
which is animated by the soul, for Descartes, body and soul are two radically separated 
ontological entities. Even the most quotidian human activity participates in two worlds. 
This appears to contradict even our most trivial experience. For example, wanting to drink 
a glass of water and deciding to reach my hand in the direction of that glass, has nothing 
to do with that mechanical body of mine being thirsty, moving my hand in that direction, 
taking the glass and bringing the water into my mouth.  
Within the Cartesian system, God is supposed to act as a bridge between soul and body, 
between the logically free world of the res cogitans, and the logically determined one of 
the res extensa. Without saying it with so many words, Descartes‘s investigation of the 
―passions of the soul‖ is in pursuit of a better conceptualization of how the two radically 
different worlds can go together. Yet, any sound solution for that problem failed to come. 
How could it? Once I start thinking (read: doubting), the mere fact of my thinking already 
proves that it is free and beyond any determination, and, thus, has nothing in common 
with the outside reality I think about, and which obeys laws of strict determination. This 
fact doesn‘t prevent this dualistic vision of man and world, however, from being utterly 
indefensible. Descartes himself felt that, but was simply unable to find a valid alternative.  
Many after Descartes have tried. One of them made history, proffering a paradigm to-
day‘s sciences still respect. In 1748, Julien Offray de La Mettrie published a philosophical 
essay entitled Man a Machine (L'homme machine)3. It conclusively resolves the problem 
                                               
 
 
3
 Julien Offray de Lamettrie (1996), Man a Machine and Other Writings, translated by Ann Thomson, Cam-
bridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.     
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of Cartesian dualism by denying the status ‗res‘ or ‗substance‘ to one of the two elements, 
more precisely, the res cogitans (the soul). Anything Descartes ascribes to the freely 
thinking and willing subject is to be considered as genuinely characteristic of the res ex-
tensa, La Mettrie argues. Man‘s subjective dimension is but a dimension, not a proper and 
independent reality. It is to be reduced entirely to his objective dimension, which is more 
than just a dimension: it is its sole, ontological substance. Thinking and willing, much like 
passions and emotions, are but bodily reactions. Erroneously, they are taken for capacities 
of a supposedly independent soul. Eventually, science will have progressed to such a de-
gree that they will become analyzable as ‗reaction formations‘ of the brain or the neuro-
logical system. 
 The arguments of La Mettrie‘s thesis, however, are untenable, if only because all 
evidence is situated in the future. Once science has progressed, we will notice that all we 
have attributed to the free human mind can in fact be ascribed to the body. Although a 
purely hypothetical— and invalid— argument, It nonetheless has become universally ac-
cepted, becoming, during the 18th and 19th century, the paradigm of modern ‗positive‘ 
sciences, and, in the 19th and 20th century, of the human and social sciences as well. In-
deed, they, too, pretend to be objective and to operate exclusively within the one and only 
substance of the res extensa: the word of material objectivity.  
 Contrary to what— with La Mettrie— we would like to believe, the problem of Car-
tesian dualism is far from being resolved. Although the ‗objective‘ sciences declared the 
subject to be non-existent, the latter was only reduced to a kind of zero-degree; it may 
have been deprived of all content, but its place remained intact.   
 The blind-spot of a science reduced to objectivity is, in fact, the place of its sub-
ject— a place, moreover, that is indispensible for its scientific character. Objective 
science presupposes a pure and empty point situated unambiguously outside its object. 
Only from such point can the object be empirically observed in a ‗neutral and impartial‘ 
manner. The objective gaze, that has become the scientific paradigm, is supposed to be 
neutral and value-free; it is a point of view emptied of all ‗subjective‘ interests. But it is 
not itself an ‗objective‘ point, i.e. a point belonging to the realm of science‘s object. It is 
precisely in this ‗point‘ (of view) that the Cartesian subject survives, a subject that still 
implies an unbridgeable gap separating it from its object— from the world outside.    
 If, within the Cartesian system, God was the bridge between soul and body, the task 
to bridge the gap between an emptied subject and the world outside can be said to have 
been taken up by the psy-sciences. Resultantly, it is especially within psychological re-
search that the new ‗episteme‘ can be clearly discerned. For if one wants to conduct psy-
chological research on a group of people, one does not ask each of its members what makes 
them a group. Science requires an objective approach. Yet the point from where such objec-
tive research operates is to be located outside the object of investigation. The behavioral 
scientist occupies a position behind a mirror that, from behind, can be looked through. This 
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way, he can observe without being observed himself. The place he occupies does not thus 
belong to the domain of his object. This place is that of the Cartesian subject reduced to its 
zero-degree. The ‗partition‘ or ‗wall‘, behind which he observes his scientific object, inevita-
bly installs the dualistic separation introduced by Descartes.4  
 This Cartesian caesura is still the central problem of our modern episteme, unable as 
we are to find a valid alternative to it. It is the hidden demarcation line crossing our world, 
which, concomitantly, binds us to, and separate us from, the world. Hidden behind that 
line, we are able to relate to the world in full freedom and do with it as we like. It is this 
invisible limit that makes modern technical power so limitless. Unbound to the world, we 
are able to behave as if we are its sovereign master. The toll of that position, however, is 
that the world is now entirely at our disposition, regardless of whether our intentions are 
good or bad. The global nuclear threat strikingly illustrates how far our bad intentions can 
go. Able to manipulate the world in such a way that, in a few moments, it can be bom-
barded back to the Stone Age, man has to realise that, in the development of his modern 
power, he has left himself outside. His modern subject position has given him an infinite 
power over the world, but not without radically alienating himself from it. It is, both, 
modern man‘s euphoria and his trauma: it makes him immune to a forever doubtful world 
without foundations nor limits, and, therefore, gives him a quasi omnipotent power over 
the world; but since, in his quality of subject, he is located outside the world, ‗subject‘ is 
also the name of what escapes this omnipotence, and becomes the latter‘s victim.  
… & emotions/passions 
The Cartesian caesura thus names the trauma modernity rests— and shakes— on; it is 
what forms and deforms, constructs and deconstructs it. The discourse about passions and 
emotions, that accompanied modernity from the outset, must be considered from within 
that perspective.  From Descartes to Spinoza, and then Damasio; from Bossuet‘s sermons 
against, to Saint-Just‘s exaltations pro, and the intimidating fascination controlling to-
day‘s media: each generation has been characterised by its own discourse about passion 
and emotion. For each generation, in its own specific manner, had to avert and repress the 
traumatic caesura upon which modernity rests upon. And since no repression is ever per-
fect, in some way or another, any form of repression inevitably lets out its trauma; resul-
                                               
 
 
4
 Psychologisation, then, can be said to be the process of the modern subject adopting, not only the terminology 
of the psy-sciences, but, also this observatory position behind the screen; the point from where one‘s gaze looks 
upon reality, including his/her reality as subject.  
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tantly, new tricks and ruses must be perennially invented in order to reinforce or reinstall 
repression.  
Initially, it was only God who, in the Cartesian system, bridged the two worlds that me-
thodical doubt had separated. Things changed when Descartes focused his philosophical 
reflection on passions and emotions. Within this affective realm, it was obvious that the 
two worlds were deeply interconnected with one another, and that the caesura splitting 
body from soul was, thus, far less radical than hitherto believed. Did the passions not 
make it abundantly clear, therefore, that the soul moves and feels the body, and the body 
moves and feels the soul? That is what Descartes had sought to approve, but he did not 
succeed in discovering a valid solution for the problems raised by his dualistic paradigm.  
In La Mettrie‘s thought, too, the passions delivered the first genuine arguments for the 
solution to the problematic Cartesian split. For what else could they do other than demon-
strate that everything is a matter of bodily affection, including the free act of thinking and 
willing? La Mettrie presaged that one day this would be proven scientifically. La Mettrie‘s 
use of future tense unintentionally reveals the point from which his ‗scientific‘ gaze oper-
ates— that it is situated outside that which his science is talking about. It represses— 
whilst simultaneously hinting at— the traumatic caesura separating the subject from the 
object it deals with. 
La Mettrie‘s solution has set the tone up till now. If we want to talk scientifically about 
emotions, then we should reduce them to objectively measurable processes. Indeed, over 
the preceding decades, this discourse has only become stronger. Feelings have become 
visible— and, thus, observable—, we are told, as evinced in brain imaging technology 
which produces colorful images of brain lobes operating. In such images, you are sup-
posed to see what happens when you feel, want, or think. And without realizing it, you 
understand: I see myself feeling, wanting, and thinking. Feelings have therefore become 
explicable: ‗look‘ at ‗ancestral facts‘, so goes the sermon of the evolutionary psychologist, 
and you see that it is your genetic material, in its search for an optimal way to guarantee 
the self-preservation of the human species, which guides you in your passion for your lov-
er. 
Are these the feelings that an ‗emotional society‘ defends and promotes? Are they to be 
recognized in their quality of ‗objective‘ values and facts? In actual fact, the ‗emotional 
society‘ defends and promotes the opposite as well— i.e. that emotions and passions do 
not need any rational legitimization to be recognized as ‗objective facts‘. Emotions and 
passions, so the argument goes, owe their right to exist to the fact that they speak for 
themselves, and give a more direct expression to what people really think in all freedom. 
Their ‗objective‘ quality is not due to the fact that they are scientifically or rationally de-
clared, as such. Emotions are what they are, whatever science may think of them; they 
must be taken for granted without any scientific legitimization.    
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Only now does the place, and function, of emotions within late-modern ideology be-
come clearer. Our current episteme concomitantly produces two contradictory axioms; the 
ideological aspect concerns the fact that the simultaneity of the contradictory axioms es-
capes our attention. On the one hand, we talk of emotions as things about which objective 
knowledge is guaranteed, and whose objective foundations can be scientifically known. 
This is the La Mettrie-side of our epochal discourse on emotions; they illustrate that all is 
objective, and that the subject, as such, is merely ‗subjective‘— which is to say that it is a 
kind of ‗ghost‘ in the machine, and thus unreliable to build solid knowledge upon. On the 
other hand, however, we find the same scientific discourse coexisting with that other om-
nipresent discourse which promotes the freedom and independence of that very subject, 
proffering it as lord and master of himself, and as ‗free entrepreneur‘ vis-à-vis the entire 
universe. Psychologisation, as the process through which the modern subject adopts both 
the terminology and the discursive position of the psy-sciences, testifies in an exemplary 
manner of this double bind. Here, emotions allow the subject to speak and behave as if it 
is not at all reducible to objective facts; or, phrased otherwise, as if it sovereignly deter-
mines, by itself, who it is and what it wants to do with the surrounding world. Here, emo-
tions are supposed to express freedom: primarily, because they express ‗themselves‘ and, 
in turn, express the subject‘s ‗self‘ in a much better way than the rational spinning, in 
which it so often gets lost.   
‗Emotions‘, on the one hand, are symptoms of the determined, objective base upon 
which the human being is founded. On the others hand, they are promoters of man‘s free 
subjective foundation. Within our epochal discourse, by means of which the ‗emotional 
society‘ conquers today‘s world, both axioms coexist unproblematically; the contradiction 
between the two remains simply unnoticed. It is with this ‗unheard-of‘ that we meet the 
core of today‘s episteme, the hidden kernel of the ‗misunderstanding through which we 
understand one another‘. Our discourse on emotions, paradoxically, presents two oppos-
ing viewpoints: it acknowledges that, as subjects, we are free and independent— that, in 
what we feel, we really know who we are and what we want—, whilst, at other moments, 
the same discourse acknowledges our freedom to be the product of an objective, determi-
nant logic, thus, denying a proper status to subjectivity.  
The signifier ‗emotions‘, therefore, simultaneously promotes a denial and an acknowl-
edgment of a fully free subject; or, in Cartesian parlance, it keeps on promoting both res 
extensa and res cogitans. It, thus, still performs the old Cartesian caesura; albeit, by expli-
citly not showing nor telling it, but, rather, by repressing both, by leaving both unsaid. 
Consequently, it reproduces the untenable, and never resolved, dualism to which we owe 
both our limitless technical power and tragic impotence to master that omnipotence.  
Through listening to our ‗emotions‘, so the pop-psychology credo goes, we hear our 
true ‗self‘ speak. On occasion, it tells us that the world is an open project offered to our 
unlimited freedom; on other occasions, the same freedom is subjected to rigorous dissec-
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tion in which we read its determinants— as, in a way, the Roman augurs did when they 
read the vicissitudes of the empire and its emperor in the uncovered intestines of birds 
plucked from heaven. Between the freedom from whence we speak, and the freedom 
whose determinants we lay bare— i.e. between the brain enabling us to submit the world 
to our freedom and the brain laid bare by brain images— there is an unbridgeable gap. 
The focus upon emotions that has perpetually accompanied modern discourse— regard-
less of whether they were used pro or contra determination— renders that gap unnoticed 
and, thus, functioning. The ‗affective‘ discourse is the central axis in psychologisation and 
runs rampant in an ‗emotional society‘. It covers its bets and so keeps hidden that it must 
bet at all. Since La Mettrie, the Cartesian gap separating us from reality has become invis-
ible and, therefore, functions all the more efficiently. The veil obfuscating that gap is wo-
ven by our discourse on emotions: emotions which we either let prevail over the rational 
discourse, or make it obey that discourse; both procedures are at the service of the same 
repression.     
Watching television, one is acutely aware that in the course of one hour we can go from 
watching a certain Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, employ unbridled 
freedom for merely emotional reasons to go straight for his goal, to enjoying a rational 
dissection of that very freedom, bringing it back to necessary determinations. For every 
talk show that provides a platform for ‗irrational‘ emotions, there is a documentary stun-
ning us with a hyper-rational discourse about the same emotions. Both go hand in hand in 
order to repress the same traumatic caesura. Yesterday‘s ‗rational‘ society and today‘s 
‗emotional‘ one are thus hand in glove.  
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